Amazon cover image
Image from Amazon.com

Mathematics and democracy : designing better voting and fair-division procedures / Steven J. Brams.

By: Material type: TextTextLanguage: English Publisher: Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, cop. 2008Description: xvi, 373 s. tabISBN:
  • 9780691133218
  • 9780691133201
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 324.601/513 22
Online resources:
Contents:
Electing a single winner : approval voting in practice -- Electing a single winner : approval voting in theory -- Electing a single winner : combining approval and preference -- Electing multiple winners : constrained approval voting -- Electing multiple winners : the minimax procedure -- Electing multiple winners : minimizing misrepresentation -- Selecting winners in multiple elections -- Selecting a governing coalition in a parliament -- Allocating cabinet ministries in a parliament -- Allocating indivisible goods : help the worst off or avoid envy? -- Allocating a single divisible good : divide-the-dollar -- Allocating multiple divisible goods : adjusted winner -- Allocating a single heterogeneous good -- Allocating divisible and indivisible goods -- Summary and conclusions
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Status Barcode
Book Högskolan Väst Entréplan / Entrance floor 324.6 Brams Available 6004300008398
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and index

Electing a single winner : approval voting in practice -- Electing a single winner : approval voting in theory -- Electing a single winner : combining approval and preference -- Electing multiple winners : constrained approval voting -- Electing multiple winners : the minimax procedure -- Electing multiple winners : minimizing misrepresentation -- Selecting winners in multiple elections -- Selecting a governing coalition in a parliament -- Allocating cabinet ministries in a parliament -- Allocating indivisible goods : help the worst off or avoid envy? -- Allocating a single divisible good : divide-the-dollar -- Allocating multiple divisible goods : adjusted winner -- Allocating a single heterogeneous good -- Allocating divisible and indivisible goods -- Summary and conclusions